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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GINGER E. ROWE,
Case No. 920507-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
NORMAN H. ROWE,

Priority No. 15
Defendant and Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals
by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(i), as amended.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Rowe raises 11 separate issues.

Mrs. Rowe will

respond to those issues but believes in general there are only
three relevant issues.
(1)

Did the parties enter into the Stipulation For

Entry of Judgment.
This is an issue of fact.

The standard of review is

whether taking all the evidence supporting the court's findings
and all reasonable inferences to be derived therefrom and viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the court's findings,
are the court's findings clearly erroneous.

College Irrigation

Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company. 780 P.2d
1241 (Utah 1989).
(2)

If the parties entered into the Stipulation, is

the Stipulation enforceable.
mark.rowe.bnef
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This involves mixed questions of fact and law.

To the

extent this issue involves questions of law, the lower court's
conclusions are accorded no particular deference and this court
reviews them for correctness.
(Utah 1989).

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176

To the extent this issue involves questions of

fact, the standard of review is whether taking all the evidence
supporting the court's findings and all reasonable inferences to
be derived therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court's findings, are the court's findings
clearly erroneous.

College Irrigation Co. v. Logan River &

Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989).
(3)

If the Stipulation is not enforceable, is the

Satisfaction of Judgment, which was given as a result of the
Stipulation, valid.
This involves mixed questions of fact and law.

To the

extent this issue involves questions of law, the lower court's
conclusions are accorded no particular deference and this court
reviews them for correctness.
(Utah 1989).

Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176

To the extent this issue involves questions of

fact, the standard of review is whether taking all the evidence
supporting the court's findings and all reasonable inferences to
be derived therefrom and viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court's findings, are the court's findings
clearly erroneous.

College Irrigation Co. v. Logan River &

Blacksmith Fork Irrigation Company. 780 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1989).

mark.rowe.bnef
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DETERMINATIVE LAW
Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.3 and Rule
4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial Administration may be
determinative.

[Addendum no. 1].
STATEMENT OF CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
Mrs. Rowe filed an Order to Show Cause why her former

husband should not be held in contempt for failure to pay child
support pursuant to a Stipulation For Entry of Judgment.
Rowe contended the Stipulation was not enforceable.

Mr.

The court

found the Stipulation was enforceable and Mr. Rowe appeals that
decision.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. and Mrs. Rowe obtained a decree of divorce in Texas
on September 19, 1986.

[R.18].

The Rowes had three children by

their marriage: two boys, Brooke and Brayton, and one girl,
Britinee.
Rowe.

[R.17].

[R.17].

Custody of the children was awarded to Mrs.

The decree obligated Mr. Rowe to pay a total of

$700 per month child support.

[R.15].

On January 15, 1988, Mrs. Rowe filed a Petition to
Amend Decree of Divorce, case no. 88-440078, seeking to increase
child support payments from Mr. Rowe.

[R.22].

On February 17,

1989, an administrative law case was brought against Mr. Rowe for
unpaid child support.

[R.144].

Judgment by default was

eventually entered against Mr. Rowe in the administrative action.
[Mr. Rowe's Brief, p.13].
mark.rowe.bnef

Mrs. Rowe filed an Amended Petition on
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March 16, 1989 which included a request for enforcement of unpaid
child support.

[R.93].

To settle their dispute, Mr. and Mrs. Rowe entered into
a Stipulation For Entry of Judgment on September 10, 1989.
[R.108].

The essence of the Stipulation was that Mrs. Rowe would

receive additional child support and, for $11,000, release her
claims for all monies owed by Mr. Rowe from the date of divorce
through July 1, 1989.

[R.108, H

1-3]. In return, Mr. Rowe

would receive a satisfaction of judgment in the administrative
proceeding.

[R.108, 13].

In reliance on the Stipulation Mrs. Rowe executed a
Satisfaction of Judgment on September 26, 1989.

[R.134].

On

October 6, 1989, Mrs. Rowe received a check for $12,600.
[R.136].

The $12,600 was designated as $11,000 to satisfy the

Judgment and $1,600 for child support for the months of August
and September, 1989.1

[R.136].

On September 26, 1989, Mrs. Rowe sent the Stipulation
to Commissioner Howard H. Maetani along with a cover letter.
[R.103].

The letter indicated Mr. Rowe agreed to pay court costs

and recording fees.

The letter also indicated Mrs. Rowe was no

longer represented by counsel.

On approximately October 20,

1989, Mrs. Rowe's former attorney officially withdrew as counsel.
[R. 170, f 13]. Mr. Rowe received a copy of Mrs. Rowe's letter
to the court on or before November 1989.
1

[R.195, 15]. Mr.

The Stipulation allowed for an increase in child support
to $800 per month from August through December, 1989. [R.108, 1
2].
mark.rowe.bnef
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Rowe's attorney, Mr. Dodd, states he submitted the Stipulation
and an Order to Commissioner Howard H. Maetani on November 20,
1989.

[R. 170, f 17].
Sometime in November, Commissioner Maetani telephoned

Mr. Dodd and stated he could not sign the Order approving the
Stipulation unless he had documents to substantiate the parties'
financial status, in compliance with the Child Support
Guidelines.

[R.170, fl9]. Mr. Dodd contacted Mr. Rowe and

advised him of the need for the additional documents.
20].

[R.170, f

Mr. Dodd did not contact Mrs. Rowe regarding the need for

additional documents.

[R.170].

Mr. Rowe did not tell Mrs. Rowe

of the court's request for financial documents.

[R. 195 & 191].

Mr. Rowe failed to forward any financial documents to
the court.

[R.170, f21]. On January 18, 1990, the court

returned the Stipulation and Order to Mr. Dodd, informing him
they could not be accepted unless supported by financial
documents.

[R. 170, f 20]. Mr. Dodd again did not inform Mrs.

Rowe of the need for financial documents.

[R.170].

There is no

indication the court informed Mrs. Rowe of the need for
additional documents.
Mr. Rowe made child support payments in accordance with
the Stipulation.

[R. 136; R. 187, check nos. 102 & 103].

Nevertheless, in September, 1990, Mr. Rowe wrote Mrs. Rowe that
the Stipulation was not valid because the court never signed the
Stipulation and the court lacked jurisdiction.

mark.rowe.bnef
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[R.191].

Mr.

Rowe, however, continued to make child support payments pursuant
to the Stipulation.

[R. 176, check no. 162].

On March 18, 1991, the court issued an Order to Show
Cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute.

[R.88].

April 15, 1991.

The case was dismissed without prejudice on

[R.96].

On February 5, 1992, Mr. Rowe petitioned the court,
case no. 92-4400164, for modification of the Texas divorce decree
regarding child support payments.

[R.25 of file 92-4400164].

On

February 14, 1992, Mrs. Rowe filed an Order to Show Cause why Mr.
Rowe should not be held in contempt for failure to pay child
support in accordance with the Stipulation.

[R.100 & 98]. On

February 28, 1992, Mrs. Rowe requested case no. 92-4400164 be
consolidated with case no. CV-88-78.

[R.30 of file 92-4400164].

The parties appeared before Commissioner Maetani on
Mrs. Rowe's Order to Show Cause on March 17, 1992. At the
hearing, Mr. Rowe argued the Stipulation was not in effect
because: (1) the issue had been resolved when both parties agreed
to drop it [R. 733, 736, 739, 740]; (2) the Stipulation never
became an order [R. 735]; (3) Mr. Rowe had five documents signed
by each party proving the Stipulation had been rescinded [R.
736]; (4) the parties reached a subsequent agreement [R.734]; and
(5) the court lacked jurisdiction [R. 739-740, 752-753].
The court found the parties entered into the
Stipulation and the Stipulation was enforceable.
3].

[R.298, f1 2 &

The court also ruled the Stipulation was effective from the

mark.rowe.brief

O

time of signing.

[R.753].

The court accepted the Stipulation

because: (1) the parties entered into it; (2) the parties relied
on it; and (3) the court believed Mr. Dodd had not filed the
Stipulation with the court.

[R.298, ?2].

The court accepted the Stipulation without obtaining
documents verifying the parties' financial status. Nevertheless,
the child support amounts required by the Stipulation exceeded
the amounts required by the Guidelines.

[Addendum no. 2].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Stipulation was entered into by Mr. and Mrs. Rowe
and both parties relied on it.

When the Court ultimately

accepted the Stipulation, it did not require the supporting
financial documents required by the Child Support Guidelines, nor
did it strictly enforce Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial
Administration.

If those be errors, they were harmless.

The

Guidelines set minimum amounts a parent is to pay for child
support.

The Stipulation required child support payments well in

excess of the minimum requirements.

Any deficiency in the

application of Rule 4-504(8) was do to the conduct of Mr. Rowe or
his attorney, not Mrs. Rowe.
Mr. Rowe's other arguments about the unenforcability of
the Stipulation either are not relevant, raised for the first
time on appeal and/or based on distorted facts.

Further, Mr.

Rowe has not properly marshalled the evidence.
Mrs. Rowe gave her former husband a Satisfaction of
Judgment in reliance on the Stipulation.
mark.rowe.bnef
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If the Court determines

the Stipulation is not enforceable, the Court must declare the
Satisfaction of Judgment null and void.
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE STIPULATION WAS VALID
A,

The Parties Entered Into The Stipulation
The court found the parties entered into the

Stipulation on September 10, 1989.
support the court's finding.

[R.298, f 2]. Several facts

First, the Stipulation itself

contains the notarized signature of both parties.

[R.108].

Also, Mr. Rowe admits entering into the Stipulation:

"To settle

said case, the parties entered into a stipulation." [Mr. Rowe's
Brief, p.4]. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to
Mrs. Rowe, along with all reasonable inferences, the court's
finding that the parties entered into the Stipulation is not
clearly erroneous and should be presumed correct.
B.

The Stipulation Is Enforceable
The court found the Stipulation was enforceable.

[R.298, If 2 & 3]. Mr. Rowe raises several arguments against its
enforcement.
1.

Whether the Stipulation is Binding on the Court is not
Relevant.
Mr. Rowe argues the Stipulation was not binding on the

court and the court had discretion to set it aside.

These are

correct statements of the law, but they are not relevant.

The

issue is not whether the Stipulation is binding on the court, but
whether it is binding on Mr. Rowe.

mark.rowe.bnef
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Further, no one forced the

court to accept the Stipulation.
argument of counsel.

It did so after hearing and

That is why Mr. Rowe is appealing.

Mr. Rowe also cites authority that a party can
repudiate a stipulation if it is justified in law or equity and
if it is timely.

Kline v. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975).

Mr.

Rowe cites no facts nor makes any claim, however, that the
parties repudiated the Stipulation.

Nor could he.

Mr. and Mrs. Rowe signed a written stipulation.

In this case,

[R.108].

Mrs.

Rowe executed a Satisfaction of Judgment in reliance on the
Stipulation.

[R.134].

Mr. Rowe paid child support pursuant to

the Stipulation for several months.

[R.136; 187, check nos. 103

& 103; 176 check no. 162]. As stated in Kline, whether a party
agrees to a stipulation is a question of fact.

Kline at 476. As

described in detail in Point I.A. above, the court's factual
finding that the parties entered into the Stipulation, is
presumed correct.
Mr. Rowe's arguments of the binding effect of the
Stipulation on the court and the court's ability to refuse to
accept a stipulation are irrelevant.

The real issue is whether

the Stipulation is binding on the parties.
2.

The Statutory Requirements Were Satisfied.
Mr. Rowe next claims the Stipulation is not enforceable

because Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.3 and Rule 4-504 of the Judicial
Code of Administration were not met.

mark.rowe.bnef
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(a)

The court'& failure to require financial documents
was harmless error because the purpose of S 78-457.3 was met,

Mr. Rowe claims the Stipulation violated Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.3(3) because it lacked the appropriate supporting
documents.

Section 78-45-7.3(3) currently states2:

(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving
parties shall submit:
(1) a completed child support worksheet;
(2) the financial verification required by
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(3) a written statement indicating whether or not
the amount of child support requested is consistent
with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall
be used to review the adequacy of a child support order
negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined
child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines
if the stipulated child support amount or combined amount
exceeds the total child support award required by the
guidelines. When the stipulation amount exceeds the
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding under
Section 78-45-7.2.
Mr. Rowe focuses solely on provision 3(a) and correctly
notes the required documents were not submitted to the court.
This, however, does not end the inquiry.

It is not enough merely

2

During the relevant time period (September, 1989), the
statute read slightly different. As stated in the Amended Notes
to § 78-45-7.3:
The 1990 amendment . . . in Subsection (3), divided former
Subsection (a) to form present Subsections (a) and (b),
rewrote Subsection (a), which had read "If a stipulation is
submitted as a basis for establishing or modifying child
support, each parent shall present financial verification
required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(4) and an affidavit fully
disclosing the financial status of each parent, as required
for use of the guidelines," and redesignated former
Subsection (b) as Subsection (c).
mark.rowe.bnef
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to show error, the error must be harmful.

An error is harmful

only if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently
high that it undermines the confidence in the court's ruling.
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
As demonstrated below, the parties financial documents would have
shown the child support required by the Stipulation exceeded the
minimum amount required by the Child Support Guidelines. Thus,
the court's error was harmless because the purpose of U.C.A. §
78-45-7.3 was met.
Judge Judith M. Billings, who chaired the task force on
the adoption of Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines, noted
one of the primary reasons guidelines were implemented was the
belief that child support orders were being set too low.

J.M.

Billings, From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adoption of Uniform
Child Support Guidelines in Utah, 1989 Utah L.Rev. 859, 878. The
problem of low child support was especially true in stipulated
matters.

Id. at 910. Judge Billings believed the current

Guidelines, while an improvement, were still set too low.
Concluding her article, Judge Billings noted: "Because the
guidelines adopted by the Utah Legislature are on the low end of
the spectrum, Utah judges should consider them a minimum, not a
maximum."

Id. at 933.

This idea is reflected in § 78-45-

7.3(3)(c) which states that if the child support amount exceeds

mark.rowe.bnef
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what is required by the Guidelines, it is deemed adequate and may
be awarded without a finding under § 78-45-7.2.3
The Stipulation ordered $266.67 a month per child
beginning August 1, 1989 and increased to $300 a month per child
beginning January 1, 1990.

[R. 108, p.2]. Mr. Rowe#s Answer to

Petition to Amend Decree of Divorce and Counterclaim, claims he
made only $8,500 in 1986 and had no income in 1987 and 1988.
[R.55, p.3]. Mr. Rowe's gross income for 1990 was $13,485.
[R.359].

In determining the amount of child support under the

Guidelines in 1989, the court would have relied on Mr. Rowe's
1988 tax return.4
income in 1988.

According to Mr. Rowe's Answer, he had no
[R.55, p.8]. Under the Guidelines, a father

with three children and no income must pay $10 per month, per
child.

[Addendum no. 2]. Even under Mr. Rowe's 1990 income

level, he would have been required to pay only $115 per month,
per child. [Addendum].

These calculations give Mr. Rowe the

benefit of the doubt by assuming Mrs. Rowe earned no income.

Any

3

U.C.A. § 78-45-7.2 concerns the application of the
Guidelines and states the Guidelines are a rebuttable
presumption.
4

The record contains no specific information about Mr.
Rowe's 1989 income. Nevertheless, the instructions for the Child
Support Worksheet state: "All income must be verified.
Verification includes . . . the last year's tax return. . . . "
[Addendum No. 2].
Further, it is Mr. Rowe's burden to show he was
prejudiced by the court's ruling. Mr. Rowe's brief provides no
information regarding his 1989 income which would verify that the
Stipulation required him to pay less than what was required by
the Guidelines.
mark.rowe.brief
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income earned by

Mrs. Rowe would further reduce Mr. Rowe's child

support obligation.5
It is clear the Stipulation provided for child support
at a level far above that required by the Guidelines.

Thus, the

underlying purpose of the Guidelines was met and the technical
issues argued by Mr. Rowe were harmless.
(b) Mr. Rowe/s Rule 4-504 argument was not raised in
the lower court; If any deficiency existed in the
application of Rule 4-504 it was due to Mr. Rowe's
or his attorney's conduct; Rule 4-504 is for the
benefit of the court and in any event, Mr. Rowe
has shown no prejudice.
Mr. Rowe claims the Stipulation is unenforceable
because Rule 4-504(8) of the Code of Judicial Administration was
not complied with.
on appeal.

This issue is being raised for the first time

Commissioner Maetani's ruling regarding the

Stipulation was appealable to the Fourth District Court.

Mr.

Rowe had an opportunity to make his Rule 4-504 argument at that
time.

He failed to do so. Mr. Rowe's Objection to Order on

Order to Show Cause and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of the Objection makes no mention of Rule 4-504.
306].

[R.

Mr. Rowe waived his Rule 4-504 argument by failing to

raise the issue in the District Court.

Mascaro v. Davis. 741

P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).

For example, if both Mr. and Mrs. Rowe each had a gross
income of $13,485, Mr. Rowe's child support obligation would be
$96 per month rather than $115. [Addendum no. 2].
mark.rowe.bnef
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Further, any violation of Rule 4-504(8) was the result
of the conduct of Mr. Rowe or his attorney.

Rule 4-504(8)

provides:
No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in
writing, signed by the attorneys of record for the
respective parties and filed with the clerk or the
stipulation was made on the record.
The Stipulation was in writing and was filed with the
court but was not signed by any attorney.

[R.108].

At the time

Mrs. Rowe signed the Stipulation, however, she was not
represented by counsel.

[R. 103]. Further, it was Mr. Rowe's

attorney who prepared the Stipulation, and it was he who failed
to provide for counsel's signature and failed to include his own
signature.

[R.170].

Mr. Rowe cannot create a defect in the

Stipulation and then rely upon that defect in seeking to have the
Stipulation set aside.

Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-

76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) .
Finally, the purpose of Rule 4-504 is: "To establish a
uniform procedure for submitting written orders, judgment and
decrees to the Court."

The Rule appears to be a housekeeping

matter for the convenience of the court.

Even if not, however,

Mr. Rowe must show he was prejudiced by not having the
Stipulation signed by an attorney. Steffensen v. Smiths
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]he
appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was
prejudicial —

mark.rowe.bnef
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error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" (citation
omitted)).
3.

No such prejudice has been alleged or shown.

The Courts Adoption of the Stipulation was Supported
By Fact.
Mr. Rowe argues the court committed reversible error in

accepting the Stipulation because the court was under the
impression the Stipulation was never filed by Mr. Rowe's
attorney.

The court, however, did not accept the Stipulation

based solely on its perception that Mr. Rowe's attorney failed to
file it.

As stated in the court's Order, the Stipulation was

accepted: (1) because the parties entered into it; and (2) the
parties relied on it.

[R.298, fl 2]. Either one of those reasons

was sufficient for the court to accept the Stipulation.
4.

There was no Waiver of the Stipulation and Mr. Rowe
Failed to Marshall the Evidence; Equitable Estoppel is
Raised for the First Time on Appeal and is Not
Applicable.
Mr. Rowe claims the Stipulation is not enforceable

because it was waived by the parties. Mr. Rowe bases this
argument on the following: Mrs. Rowe failed to insist on the
adoption of the Stipulation in 1989; Mrs. Rowe failed to provide
the documents requested by the court; Mrs. Rowe accepted $700 per
month as per the Texas Decree.

[Mr. Rowe's Brief p.17].

Mr.

Rowe's argument is based on distorted facts.
The court returned the Stipulation to Mr. Rowe's
attorney, not to Mrs. Rowe.

Mr. Dodd's Affidavit states he

informed Mr. Rowe of the court's request for supporting
documents.
mark.rowe.bnef
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for additional documents.

[R.170, f 19]. Mr. Rowe's Affidavit

states that upon receiving word from his attorney that the court
rejected the Stipulation, Mr. Rowe passed that information on to
Mrs. Rowe.

[R.195, f 7]. Mr. Rowe's Affidavit, however, does

not state he told Mrs. Rowe of the court's request for the need
for supporting documents.

[R.195].

Indeed, as stated in Mr.

Rowe's Affidavit, this conversation is memorialized in a letter
dated September, 1990. [R.195, f 7]

The letter mentions nothing

about the need for additional documents.

[R.191].

In sum, Mr.

Rowe provides no evidence Mrs. Rowe knew of the need for
additional documents to support the Stipulation.
clear, however:

This much is

Mr. Rowe knew of the need for additional

documents, but failed to provide them.
Mr. Rowe also argues that, based on the total amount of
support he paid, Mrs. Rowe knew he was only complying with the
Texas Decree.

That argument is misleading.

Mr. Rowe's child

support payments actually confirm he was acting in accordance
with the Stipulation.

The Texas decree worked-out to

approximately $233 per child.

The Stipulation, however, required

$300 per month for each child after January 1, 1990.

Check no.

102, dated January 26, 1990, for $300 is designated "for Britinee
in Utah."

[R. 187]. And, check no. 103, also dated January 26,

1990, is for $600 and is designated "Feb. support for boys in
Colorado."

[R. 187]. As late as December, 1990, over a year

after the Stipulation was signed, Mr. Rowe sent a check for $900
designated as "Dec. child support."
mark.rowe.brief
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[R. 176, check no. 162].

Mr. Rowe's twisting of the facts brings up an important
point.

With regard to factual issues, it is Mr. Rowe's duty to

marshall all competent evidence that tends to support the court's
findings.

Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988).
[T]he marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to
merely have pertinent excerpts from the record readily
available to a reviewing court. The marshaling process
is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel
must extricate himself or herself from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings
the appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient
to convince the appellate court that the court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.

West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Mr. Rowe cannot limit his challenge to

evidence which he claims supports a different finding.

Horton v.

Gem State Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)("Gem State still failed to meet its obligation to marshal
the evidence by persistently arguing its own position without
regard for the evidence supporting the trial court's findings . .
. ."

Id.). Mr. Rowe fails to marshal the evidence properly.

His primary, if not sole, focus is on evidence which he claims
contradicts the court's findings. Mr. Rowe persistently argues
his position and rarely marshals any evidence which supports the
court's findings.

When he does marshal some supporting evidence,

he omits any reference to key evidence supporting the findings.

mark.rowe.bnef
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Mr. Rowe failed to properly marshal the evidence.

The Court

should ignore his argument.
Mr. Rowe also claims Mrs. Rowe is equitably estopped
from enforcing the Stipulation.
the first time on appeal.

This issue is being raised for

Unless equitable estoppel is raised in

the lower court, the argument is waived.

Matter of Estate of

Justheim. 824 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Mr. Rowe had

an opportunity to make an equitable estoppel argument when he
appealed the Commissioner's ruling to the District Court.
not.

[R. 306]. Thus, the argument is waived.

He did

Further, Mr. Rowe

bases this argument on the same distorted facts described above.
Again, there has been no marshalling of the evidence.
5.

There was a Meeting of the Minds Concerning the
Stipulation.
The essence of this argument is that although Mrs. Rowe

signed the Stipulation and seeks to enforce it, the Stipulation
should not be enforced against Mr. Rowe because his former wife
really did not understand the terms and conditions of the
Stipulation.

[Mr. Rowe's brief, p. 18].

Mr. Rowe supports this argument with a letter from Mrs.
Rowe to the court after the Stipulation had been signed by both
parties.

The letter states Mr. Rowe agreed to pay all court

costs and recording fees.

The Stipulation was silent about

recording fees but stated each party would pay its respective
court costs.

Mr. Rowe then claims, because of the letter, he

believed the Stipulation was no longer binding because it was

mark.rowe.bnef
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obvious there was no meeting of the minds. Again, Mr. Rowe
distorts the facts and fails to properly marshall the evidence.
Mr. Rowe's self serving claim that he did not think the
Stipulation was enforceable because of Mrs. Rowe's letter,
appears to have been invented after the fact.

As noted above,

Mr. Rowe abided by the Stipulation for over a year after it was
signed.

Also, when Mr. Rowe wrote his former wife explaining why

he thought the Stipulation was not valid, he stated: "I also
informed you that this document [the Stipulation] was not valid
because the judge never signed the order - and that you were not
a resident of Utah - but instead of Colorado.ff [R. 191]. No
mention of Mrs. Rowe's letter.

The transcript of the hearing

before Commissioner Maetani also never mentions Mrs. Rowe's
letter.

[R. 726-757].

Indeed, at the hearing Mr. Rowe stated

the reasons he thought the Stipulation was not in effect were:
(1) the issue had been resolved when both parties agreed to drop
it [R. 733, 736, 739, 740]; (2) the Stipulation never became an
order [R. 735]; (3) Mr. Rowe had five documents signed by each
party proving the Stipulation had been rescinded [R. 736]; (4)
the parties reached a subsequent agreement [R.734]; and (5) the
court lacked jurisdiction [R. 739-740, 752-753].

It was not

until after the hearing that Mr. Rowe first came up with the idea
that there had not been a meeting of the minds.
Mrs. Rowe never pursued the issue of court costs and
recording fees and does not now seek those costs and fees. Mrs.
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Rowe seeks only to enforce the Stipulation as it was written.
That is all the court found was enforceable.
6.

There Was No Improper Execution.
Finally, Mr. Rowe claims the court committed reversible

error because the Order on Order to Show Cause contains only the
stamped reproduction of the Commissioner's signature.
is Mr. Rowe grasping at straws, he is factually wrong.

Not only
True, the

Order located at R. 296 contains a stamped signature, but that is
not the original Order.

The original Order on Order to Show

Cause is located at R. 47 in the file of Case No. 92-4400164.
That case was consolidated with this case by order of the court.
[R. 199]. The original Order contains Commissioner Maetani's
actual signature.
II.

[Addendum no. 3].

IF THE STIPULATION IS NOT VALID, THE SATISFACTION OF
JUDGMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE
The essence of the Stipulation was that Mrs. Rowe would

grant Mr. Rowe a satisfaction of judgment if she received $11,000
and obtained an increase in child support.
the Stipulation was never valid.

Mr. Rowe now claims

If that it so, then the

Satisfaction of Judgment, which Mrs. Rowe granted Mr. Rowe as
part of the Stipulation, must be set aside.
Mr. Rowe paid $11,000 as part of the bargain to obtain
the Satisfaction of Judgement.

Mrs. Rowe, however, claims Mr.

Rowe owed her approximately $40,000 at the time.

[R.727].

Mr.

Rowe disputes that amount (R.743), but that is not the point.
Mrs. Rowe believed she was giving up a claim to a substantial
amount of money and in return she obtained an increase in child
mark.rowe.bnef
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support.

Mr. Rowe now claims he was never bound to pay the

increased support, but in the same breath claims the Satisfaction
of Judgment is enforceable.

He cannot have it both ways. This,

too, was a finding of the court.

[R.298, 1 2].

If the Court determines the Stipulation is invalid, the
Court must also set aside the Satisfaction of Judgment and allow
Mrs. Rowe to pursue Mr. Rowe for the additional amounts she
claims he owes her.

The $11,000 Mr. Rowe has already paid should

be considered a credit for any amounts he ultimately owes her.6
CONCLUSION
The Stipulation is enforceable.

The lower court's

Order on Order to Show Cause should be upheld.

If the Court

determines the Stipulation is not enforceable, the Satisfaction
of Judgment must be set aside.
DATED:

April 26, 1993.
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

/fhjL

By

tJ> /?(**_

Re id E. Lewfe5^
Mark W. May V
Attorneys for Ginger E. Rowe

6
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